

Exhibit K

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pdf

Understanding our Non-Second-Price-Bidder (NSPB)

- Historical 2nd-Price auctions are over
- What should we bid?
 - 1st Price and 2nd Price auctions
 - General case
- How does the Non-Second-Price-Bidder work?
- Final Optimal Bid Formula:
 - 1st Step: Estimate pWin
 - Logistic regression Model
 - Example of learning
 - Asymptote
 - Negative Shapes Issue
 - 2nd Step: Estimate degree of FirstPriceNess
 - Computing C2(b) using estimated pWin
- Range of computation of the optimal bid
 - Upper bound UB: The bid can not be higher than the value provided in the entry, otherwise, the yield can be negative
 - Lower bound LB: the lower bound of the searching range is defined by many parameters
- Final Optimal Bid Formula:
- Variables used in NSPB
- Monitoring NSPB
- Improving NSPB:

Historical 2nd-Price auctions are over

Classic Second-price auctions, which were the standard 3 years ago, are becoming more and more rare.

In order to increase their short-term profit and with the apparition of Header Bidding, publishers and platforms RTB have moved to different and more complicated auction mechanisms:

- First price auctions (whose share of voice have constantly increased for 3 years and which currently represent [REDACTED] of our Spend)
- Usage of Clearing Prices (or Floors) to guarantee a minimal spend
- Priority Rules (Sponsorship, Google First Look, PMPs)



What should we bid?

For a given estimation of the value of a display opportunity, the optimal bidding strategy depends on the auction type.

In an environment switching from 2nd price to 1st price, Criteo had to adapt its bidding strategy.



Let's consider a display opportunity, for which the estimated value is equal to:


$$V = eCPM \times bidRando_{user} \times (1 - MinMargin)$$

We want to bid in order to maximize our expected profit, or expected Yield.

$$Profit(b) = pWin(b) \times (V - cost(b))$$

1st Price and 2nd Price auctions






How does the Non-Second-Price-Bidder work?


At TLAs Level, the computation of the optimal bid is done in arbitrage, in a specific library called External Bidder.





The actual value received by the NSPB is the product of:











Improving NSPB:

1. **Gather insights**

Select new features or scope that could be integrated or taken into account in the models (for instance variables that could impact a winning rate curve, or an auction model). These are usually business insights, and can be provided by local teams

2. **Offline Tests: Do we improve the models?**

The goal of this part is to see that our prediction models (particularly pWin one) are improved by this change. In other words, are we able to better predict a display considering that we participate? This analysis is purely offline, based on past data.
Key Metrics: Log Likelihood (LLH), RSME

3. **Online Tests: Does it bring value to Criteo?**

When an improvement looks positive offline, we run an A/B Test, and check whether we improve key publisher Metrics (both Short-term and Long-term). The most important metric is the "Subsidies Aware Long-Term Yield (or SALT)".

More details here:

